A Trade-Investment Model for Distribution of Wealth by Scafetta, Nicola et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
30
65
79
v2
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  1
5 S
ep
 20
03
A Trade-Investment Model for Distribution of
Wealth
Nicola Scafetta a, Bruce J. West a, b and Sergio Picozzi a
aDepartment of Physics and Free Electron Laser Laboratory, Duke University,
Durham, NC 27708, USA
bMathematics Division, Army Research Office, Research Triangle Park, NC
27709-2211, USA
Abstract
Econophysics provides a strategy for understanding the potential mechanisms un-
derlying the anomalous distribution of wealth found in real societies. We present
a computational nonlinear stochastic model for the distribution of wealth that de-
pends upon three parameters and two mechanisms: trade and investment. To avoid
economic paradoxes, the trade mechanism is assumed to be related to the poorer
trader’s wealth and to statistically advantage the poorer of the two traders. The
two mechanisms together are shown to generate a distribution that reproduces the
full range of the empirical wealth distribution, and not only the inverse power-law
tail that Pareto found in western societies at the end of the 19th century.
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1 Introduction
The science of complexity leads to an understanding of complex physical phe-
nomena through the construction of both equilibrium and dynamical models.
These ideas have found application in engineering, biology, sociology and eco-
nomics; specifically, in areas where phenomena have both the characteristics
of randomness and determinism [1], present nonlinear and non-extensive be-
haviors and/or anomalous distributions. To understand the main mechanisms
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that lead to the empirical distribution of wealth in a society is one of such
applications.
More than a century ago the Italian sociologist and economist, Vilfredo Pareto
determined that the cumulative probability of high income in western societies
obeys to an inverse power law,
P (w) =
∞∫
w
p(x) dx ∝ 1
wµ
, (1)
with 1 ≤ µ ≤ 2 [2] and where p(x) is the probability density function (pdf) of
wealth.
It is straightforward to observe that wealth and income are different concepts
[3]. However, even if individual wealth and income are related in a very com-
plex way, their empirical distributions, regarding an entire society, look sim-
ilar. Compare, for example, the shape of the wealth distribution for United
Kingdom studied in Ref. [4] with that of the income distributions for United
Kingdom and other countries studied in Refs. [4,5]. Fig. 1 shows the cumulative
distribution of wealth and income data for United Kingdom, downloaded from
Inland Revenue, the British tax agency [6]. In particular, the reconstructed
wealth distribution of the whole UK population was obtained by using an ad-
justment procedure applied to the data of all assets and liabilities of a person
that must be reported at his or her death for the purpose of inheritance tax
[4].
Since Pareto’s time a new field of research, econophysics, has emerged showing
that physically-based models yield possible explanations of economic mecha-
nisms in society [7]. In 1983 Montroll and Shlesinger [8] demonstrated that
renormalization group scaling provides an interpretive context for Pareto’s in-
verse power-law distribution. In fact, according to the renormalization group
theory, a function F (x) is homogeneous if there are two constants a and b,
such that F (x) = a F (bx). The simplest solution to this equation is given by a
Pareto law (1) with µ = log a/ log b for 0 < (a, b) < 1, [9]. Moreover, Montroll
and Shlesinger argue that if g (w) is the distribution of wealth excluding the
very rich, the total distribution should have the anomalous form
G (w) = g (w) + a G (b w) (2)
where b is a mechanism that increases the variance of the distribution and a is
the probability of that mechanism being present in the society. For very large
w the distribution obtained from solving (2) is a Pareto’s law
lim
w→∞
G(w) ∝ 1
wµ
, (3)
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and for low-medium level of wealth the distribution is
lim
w←∞
G (w) = g (w) . (4)
Thus, they explain the inverse power-law tail in the distribution of wealth as
a scaling effect in an equilibrium statistical society. On the other side, Eq. (2)
suggests that the distribution of wealth at high and low ends is affected by
different mechanisms. Indeed, full range empirical distributions of wealth or
income [4,5] do present such a differentiation. For example, Fig. 1 shows the
cumulative probability of wealth during 1996 and of income during 1998-1999
in United Kingdom [6]. It is easy to see the separation between low-medium
level and high level that is characterized by a Pareto law and involves almost
1% of the population. In this paper we present a nonlinear physically-based
model for wealth distribution able to interpret it.
While many have used variants of the Montroll-Shlesinger argument to ex-
plain several phenomena [10], here, we take a different approach and identify
possible dynamical and stochastic mechanisms that lead to the observed distri-
bution of wealth. We draw inspiration from the evolution equation postulated
by Bouchaud and Me´zard [11] that supposes distribution of wealth depends
on trades and investments, but we introduce different rules for trading dy-
namics. In Sec. 2 we review some models found in the econophysics literature
like the mean-field approximation of the Bouchaud and Me´zard model [11]
and the kinetic theory approximation [4,12,13,14] and explore some economic
paradoxes induced by these approximations about the trade mechanism. In
Sec. 3 we postulate a nonlinear stochastic trade-investment model that does
not encounter the difficulties of the above approximations and we determine
the properties of the model through numerical solutions. In Sec. 4 we argue
the validity of our trade-investment model in interpreting the full range (both
high and low ends) of the empirical wealth distribution as that recently found
in the United Kingdom and shown in Fig. 1. Finally, we draw conclusions in
Sec. 5.
2 Economic paradoxes of some asset exchange linear models
Distribution of wealth depends mainly on two mechanisms: trade and invest-
ment [4,5,11,12,13,14,15,16,17]. We stress that in the physically-based models
trade and investment should always be understood in a generalized sense.
A linear model proposed by Bouchaud and Mezard [11], borrowed from the
physics of directed polymers, describes the dynamics of the individual wealth
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Wi(t) in a given a society of N agents by mean of the following equation
dWi
dt
= ηi(t) Wi +
N∑
j=1(6=i)
Jij Wj −
N∑
j=1(6=i)
Jji Wi . (5)
The component ηi(t) Wi is a Gaussian multiplicative process with variance σ
that simulates the investment dynamics and it is related, for example, to the
temporal change in the value of stocks [11,18,19,20,21]. The two sum terms
of Eq. (5) describe the trade interaction network between the agent i and all
other agents in the society and Jij is the exchange rate between agents i and
j.
Usually, Eq. (5) is solved with the simplifying assumption that the exchange
rate for all agents is the same, i.e., Jij ≡ J/N , so that Eq. (5) reduces to
dWi
dt
= ηi(t) Wi + J(W −Wi) , (6)
where W = N−1
∑
iWi is the mean wealth. Eq. (6) is the mean-field approx-
imation of the trade process [11]. Such an approximation is useful because
Eq. (6) can be associated with a solvable Fokker-Planck equation with the
following equilibrium pdf solution
peq(w) = Ψ exp
[
1− µ
w
]
1
w1+µ
, (7)
where Ψ = (µ − 1)µ/Γ[µ] is the normalization constant and µ = 1 + J/σ2 is
the Pareto exponent [11].
However, the power-law tail of Eq. (7) is due to the multiplicative term in
(6) [22], and does not, by itself alone, assure the goodness of the mean-field
approximation in describing a realistic trade process. In the absence of the
multiplicative process, the mean-field approximation causes the wealth of all
economic agents to exponentially converge toward the mean wealth W . In
fact, the solution of Eq. (6) without the multiplicative process is
Wi(t) = W + (Wi(0)−W ) exp[−J t] , (8)
implying that the trade dynamics has the effect of equalizing the wealth among
all members of the society so that the observed condensation of the wealth is
interpreted as due solely to the presence of the investment process.
This form of trade, implicit in the mean-field approximation, does not seem
realistic because it assumes that the agent i gives the fraction J/N of his own
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wealth to the agent j and, in exchange, receives the same fraction J/N of
agent j’s wealth. So, a consistent amount of wealth, proportional to the rich
agent’s wealth, passes to the poor; an outcome that is not encountered in the
real world. Instead, in a real trade, the rich always risk less than do the poor
(in a statistical sense), because of their greater resources. This property should
be fulfilled by the trade mechanism such that, in addition to the investment
mechanism, the trade, too, has the capacity to produce a condensation of
wealth.
A similar economic paradox is shared by the kinetic theory approximation
when applied to the trade interaction between two agents [4,12,13,14]. This ap-
proximation yields a Maxwell-Boltzmann exponential distribution for energy
(p(E) ∝ e−E/kT ). In fact, the kinetic theory approximation assumes that the
transactions of wealth are similar to the transaction of energy in random elastic
collisions between particles. Therefore, according to such an analogy, in a trade
transaction the total wealth-energy (or a fraction of it according to the reaction
scheme [Wi,Wj]→ [γWi+ ε(1−γ)(Wi+Wj), γWj+(1− ε)(1−γ)(Wi+Wj)],
[14]) of both traders should mix, become randomly divided between the two
traders and, on average, leave the two of them with the same amount of wealth.
Also in this case, in a trade interaction between the rich and poor, the poor
have an extraordinary chance to significantly increase their wealth; an unre-
alistic outcome. Moreover, the empirical distributions of wealth or income are
not monotonic [6]; they increase, reach a maximum and, finally, decrease as
an inverse power-law function. Therefore, the empirical distribution of wealth
or income can not be recovered by the monotonically decreasing exponential
distribution of Maxwell and Boltzmann.
It is also not convincing that in a trade a randomly selected agent loses a fixed
fraction of his own wealth to a randomly selected winner [12,15] according to
the reaction scheme [Wi,Wj] → [Wi − γWi,Wj + γWi], where 0 < γ < 1 is
the fraction of wealth-energy of the loser gained by the winner. Such a trade
mechanism would imply that in a transaction the richer the trader, the more
he/she may lose in favor of the poorer trader.
These economic paradoxes, common to both the mean-field and kinetic theory
approximations, seem to be related to the fact that those linear models assume
a type of symmetric status of the two traders. Both approximations assume
that the amount of wealth that can move from one agent to the other may be
linearly related to the wealth of both agents or, at least, to the wealth of one
of them randomly selected. We make what we believe to be a more realistic
assumption regarding the common trade interaction dynamics.
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3 A nonlinear trade-investment model
We assume certain characteristics for the trading transaction that avoid the
above paradoxes. First, we assume that in a trade between the rich and poor,
the wealth that moves from one agent to the other is related to the wealth of
the poorer of the two traders. In fact, only in a robbery the poorer trader can
get a fraction of the wealth of the richer trader and the distribution of wealth
of an entire society cannot reasonable be a product of a “theft-and-fraud”
mechanism. Second, the trade mechanism has to take in account the role
played by the prices in mediating exchange and how these prices emerge from
ideal negotiations among agents that may belong to different social classes.
Finally, we have to consider that a transaction of wealth in a trade is related
to the difference between the price and the value of the asset.
We modify the linear Eq. (5) and suppose that the i-th agent’s wealth Wi(t)
evolves according to the stochastic nonlinear equation
Wi(t + 1) = Wi(t) + riξ(t)Wi(t) +
N∑
j=1(6=i)
wij(t). (9)
Here, as in Eq. (5), the component ri ξ Wi is a Gaussian multiplicative process
that simulates investment dynamics. The variable ξ(t) is a Gaussian random
variable and the standard deviation ri > 0 is the individual investment index.
We interpreted ri = V Πi where V is the global investment index of the entire
society, and Πi is the percentage of wealth Wi that the i-th agent actually
invests. The summation in Eq. (9) describes the trade transactions between
agent i and all other agents. If in the temporal interval [t : t+1] two particular
agents do not actually trade, there is no transfer of wealth between them, that
is, wij(t) = 0.
In a trade there is a flow of wealth between the two agents only if, in the case
of the barter, the value of the two exchanged assets is different, or, in the case
of the purchase, the value of the asset is different from the price paid for it.
By expressing this concept in an equation, if the trader i is the seller and the
trader j is the buyer, the exchanged wealth quantity wij is given by
wij = priceasset − valueasset . (10)
In fact, if the price and the value of the asset coincide, the trade would produce
only a transfer of items and money from one agent to the other, but there
would not be any transfer of wealth. Instead, if the seller (buyer) succeeds in
selling (buying) an item for a price that is higher (lower) than the actual value
of the item, the seller (buyer) gains wealth from the buyer (seller). Therefore,
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the trade interaction between two agents is assumed to follow the scheme
[Wi(t),Wj(t)]→ [Wi(t + δt),Wj(t+ δt)], where
[Wi(t+ δt),Wj(t + δt)] = [Wi(t) + wij(t),Wj(t) + wji(t)] . (11)
Because of Eq. (10), the trade variable wij is antisymmetric (wij = −wji), may
be positive or negative and indicates the amount of wealth that moves from
one agent to the other in each trade. The antisymmetric nature of the trade
variable wij implies that the trade itself, contrary to the investment process,
conserves the total wealth because it can only move wealth from one agent to
another, but can neither create nor destroy wealth.
The amount of wealth wij that may move from the trader i to the trader
j is a stochastic nonlinear variable that has to be a fraction of the wealth
of the poorer of the two agents and depends nonlinearly on the wealths of
both traders. The simplest hypothesis consistent with these assumptions is to
suppose that wij is a Gaussian variable with density
p(wij) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
[
−(wij − wij)
2
2σ2
]
, (12)
where wij is the mean wealth that may move between the two traders i and
j,
σ = h Wij (13)
is the standard deviation of the distribution of wij where 0 < h < 1 indicates
the fraction of Wij that may be involved in the trade, and the quantity
Wij = Wji = min(Wi,Wj) (14)
is the lesser of the two agents’ wealth. We refer to the index h > 0 as the
poverty index. In fact, in a poor society the ratio of cost to wealth is higher
and, therefore, the higher is the amount of wealth that may move in a single-
trade transaction. The choice of the expression that indicates the mean wealth
wij that may move from the trader i to the trader j is of crucial importance.
For reasons explained subsequently, we assume that
wij = αij h Wij (15)
where the variable αij is given by a nonlinear expression depending on the
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wealths of both traders, for example,
αij = f
Wj −Wi
Wj +Wi
. (16)
We refer to the index f > 0 as the social index because it provides an advan-
tage to the poorer of the two traders. In fact, by using Eqs. (12), (15) and
(16) it is easy to prove that if the wealths Wi and Wj are almost the same,
then αij ≈ 0 and both traders have an equal chance of doing either a good or
bad deal. If, instead, for example, Wj ≫Wi, we have αij ≈ f , the distribution
p(wij) is shifted toward positive values and the trader i, that in this example
would be the poorer, has a better chance to do a good deal and increase his
own wealth. Finally, the amount of moving wealth is always a fraction of the
wealth of the poorer of the two agents.
A possible interpretation of the trade interaction mechanisms described by
Eqs. (10), (11) and (12) may be formulated by considering that in a trade
there is a transfer of wealth between two agents only if the value of the asset
is different from the price paid for it, Eq. (10). The variable wij of Eqs. (10),
(11) and (12) measures such a difference and is stochastic because the price
of an asset, or similar assets, is not unique but varies within a range in a real
society. So, there may be the possibility to buy or sell an asset at a price that
may be lower or higher than the value of that asset. We observe that this
price dispersion is due to the fact that the price is an agreement between the
two traders that follows an explicit or implicit trade negotiation and different
negotiations may yield different prices for the same item. Therefore, we are not
assuming the “law of one price” [23], which is a simplistic assumption made in
most economic models (including Pareto’s [24]) that attempt to dynamically
address the problem. On the contrary, the value of an item is a concept that
involves the entire society and the total wealth of an individual is measured by
the total value of his or her belonging and not by the price of such possessions.
The stochastic nonlinear bias, see Eqs. (15) and (16), that favors the poorer
trader is due to the fact that a trade can take place only if the two agents,
through negotiation, reach an agreement about the price of the asset. The
trade transaction has a higher probability to occur if the price is below a
threshold at which the buyer would like to buy. Because this threshold in-
creases with the total wealth of an agent, when a wealthy agent would like
to buy something from a poorer agent, there is a higher probability that the
transaction occurs at a higher price than when a wealthy agent would like
to sell the same item to a poorer agent. Alternatively, we may say that the
poor are constrained by their poverty to be more careful in their trades and
therefore, for example, they may often look for the best price opportunity for
saving money. On the other hand, because of their economic strength, the
rich may be willing to pay a premium to purchase items. This asymmetric
8
disadvantage-advantage tends to disappear when the two traders are econom-
ically equivalently.
In the next subsections we investigate step by step the properties of the trade-
investment model. Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 are devoted to study the properties
of the trade interaction without any investment.
3.1 Symmetric-chance trade-alone model
Let us assume h > 0, f = 0 and r = 0, that is, we have a trade-alone
economy according to which both agents have the same chance to gain or
lose and in which there are no investments. We observe that f = 0 implies
wij = 0 in Eq. (12), therefore, the distribution p(wij) (12) is symmetric and
centered on zero. In this model it is easy to prove that almost all the wealth
of our ideal society concentrates in the hands of a few agents. In fact, because
the wealth wij is related to the poorer agent’s wealth, through the standard
deviation σ = h Wij of the probability distribution (12), the risk for the rich
trader is smaller because if he/she loses a certain amount of wealth in a trade-
transaction, the loss is a smaller fraction of his/her own wealth than that
which the poorer agent may lose. Consequently, there is a high probability in
this model that few people accumulate almost the entire wealth available and
the others become devastatingly poor.
Fig. 2 shows the huge wealth gap between the rich and poor produced by
the symmetric-chance model. This gap increases with the number of trade
interactions and the process is boosted by increasing the poverty index h. In
fact, in such an eventuality the poor may lose a larger portion of their wealth
in each single transaction. If the model is implemented with a wealth threshold
below which an agent is considered economically impotent, the entire wealth
of the society will concentrate in the hands of one person while all the others
die.
This economic catastrophe, the gambler’s ruin problem [25], is due simply to
the intrinsic economic strength of the rich and, therefore, such a collapse may
happen also without any economic abuse or exploitation of the poor by the
rich. This condensation aspect of the trade-interaction dynamics is completely
masked by the mean-field approximation of the Bouchaud and Mezard’s model
[11] that, without any investment, yields a uniform distribution of wealth.
Moreover, the strong wealth condensation of the fair trade economy also ex-
plains why, to avoid economic collapse, in real societies there exist a number
of mechanisms that have the effect of redistributing wealth by advantaging
the poor.
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3.2 Asymmetric-chance trade-alone model
The redistribution mechanism that advantages the poor is implemented by
supposing that the probability distribution of transaction of wealth wij , Eq.
(12), is biased in favor of the poorer trader. The bias is introduced through
the mean transaction wealth wij 6= 0 because we now assume the social index
f > 0 (16), and we again assume h > 0 and r = 0. A social index f > 0
provides an advantage to the poorer of the two traders.
The asymmetric-chance model redistributes the wealth, as shown in Fig. 3, and
leads to a stable distribution. In addition, this model shows the emergence of
a large middle class, followed by a smaller poor class and an even smaller rich
class. The economic gap between the richest and poorest is not unrealistically
wide, as it was in the symmetric-chance model. The condensation of wealth,
that is, the wealth separation between the richest and poorest increases by
decreasing the social index f . Fig. 3 also shows that this type of distribution
of wealth can be well fitted with a Gamma-like distribution
p(w) = a (w − c)η exp(−d w), (17)
that has an exponential-like tail. In the computer simulation we suppose a soci-
ety of 100,000 economical agents with an initial uniform distribution of wealth
and determine the wealth pdf after 100 million random trade-interactions be-
tween two randomly selected agents.
Fig. 4 shows how the asymmetric-chance model depends on the poverty index
h. By keeping the social index f fixed, the wealth gap between the richest
and poorest increases by increasing the poverty index h. In fact, in a rich
society, one based on trade alone, wealth is better distributed because it is
more difficult for wealth to condense into the hands of a very few agents
because people need less money to buy items. Consequently, in each trade-
interaction agents may lose a smaller fraction of their wealth.
In summary, our trade interaction model is based on the balance of two oppos-
ing contributions: (i) the condensation mechanism of the fair trade dynamics;
(ii) a redistribution factor giving a stochastic advantage to the poor. When
both processes are present, the trade interaction mechanism produces a stable
distribution of wealth well fitted with a Gamma-like distribution.
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3.3 Pareto tail in the trade-investment economy
In the last step we assume all three indexes of the trade-investment model
are positive: h > 0, f > 0 and r > 0. Fig. 5 shows the distribution of wealth
for three computer simulations in which we implement the previous model by
assuming that every 10,000 trades the wealth of all agents is re-initialized by
the multiplicative process. We fit the tail of the computer-generated wealth
pdf with a Pareto distribution 1/xδ, where µ = δ − 1 is the Pareto’s expo-
nent. These computer-generated wealth pdfs may be apparently well-fitted by
functions of the form
p(w) = a wγ/(1 + b w)γ+δ . (18)
However, we stress that in the absence of the analytic solution to Eq. (9),
we do not know the exact analytic form for these computational distributions
and, as we will explain in Sec. IV, the true solution to Eq. (9) is more complex
than Eq. (18). However, we notice that the functions (17) and (18) may be
related, one the other, in the limit r → 0 because an exponential function
can be obtained from a power-law function via an appropriate limit procedure
[26].
Fig. 5 shows that wealth condensation increases by increasing the investment
index r and by decreasing the social index f . The connection with the poverty
index h is more complicated and will be explained in the next section. As in
the asymmetric-chance model, we obtain a stable distribution of wealth p(w)
that partitions society into three classes. Fig. 6 shows the cumulative probabil-
ity P (w) for an economy with f = 0.3, h = 0.05 and r = 0.075, fitted with the
Pareto distribution having an index α = δ − 1 = 1.5. This figure is consistent
with the fit to U.S. income data made in Figure 35 of Montroll and Badger
[27]. According to a more recent study made by Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko [4]
concerning the cumulative probability of income in the United Kingdom and
the United States, during the period 1994-1999 the United Kingdom was char-
acterized by a Pareto exponent in the interval 1.8 < α < 2.3 and during the
year 1998 the United States was characterized by a Pareto exponent α ≈ 1.7.
By assuming that the cumulative wealth distributions have Pareto exponents
similar to that of the correspondent income distributions, these different val-
ues of the Pareto exponent would imply that wealth is more concentrated in
the United States than it is in the United Kingdom. By supposing similar in-
vestment economies of the two countries, the higher value of the UK Pareto’s
index can be interpreted in the context of our model as being due to the social
policies adopted in the UK, yielding a higher social index f .
The inset in Fig. 6 shows that in the wealth interval [10,100] the cumulative
probability P (w), for an ideal economy with f = 0.3, h = 0.05 and r =
11
0.075, can be fitted by an exponential function. A similar result is found by
Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko [4] in empirical cumulative probability of wealth
in the United Kingdom. However, the exponential fit, that would justify the
application of the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution model, see Sec. 2, to the
wealth as well as income distribution at low value, is here only apparent and
not real. These authors recognize that at low income, and we suppose at
low wealth as well, the pdf is not monotonic because it increases and then
decreases, and may be better fit by a Gamma distribution, but Dra˘gulescu
et al. [4] do not have any model to reproduce this behavior of the empirical
data. Instead, as Fig. 5 shows, this non-monotonic behavior of the distribution
at low and middle wealth value is well reproduced by the trade-investment
model. Therefore, caution must be exercised in drawing conclusion from the
data fitting of the cumulative distribution alone.
4 Wealth and income distributions in societies
As anticipated in the introduction and in the previous section the full range
empirical distributions of income of several countries [4,5,8,28] present a dif-
ferentiation between the rich and non-rich classes. Fig. 1 shows that, at least
for United Kingdom, wealth and income distributions look very similar, there-
fore we suppose that such a differentiation is a general property for the wealth
distributions as well. The middle-low wealth range appears to follow a distri-
bution that Dra˘gulescu et al. [4] fit with an exponential while Souma, following
Gibrat [29], fits with a log-normal distribution. The higher wealth range, that
involves only 1-2% of the population, maintains a Pareto tail. This particular
anomalous shape may be recovered by the trade-investment model as Figs. 7
and 8 show.
A possible interpretation of the separation effect is that the investment index
varies among the members of society, as we have already suggested in Eq.
(9). The simplest option is to assume that N1 agents invest their wealth with
a investment index r1 and N2 = N − N1 agents invest their wealth with a
different investment index r2:
dWi
dt
= r1 ξ Wi +
N∑
j=1(6=i)
wij , i ≤ N1 (19)
dWi
dt
= r2 ξ Wi +
N∑
j=1(6=i)
wij , i > N1 . (20)
In the eventuality that the system is characterized by more than two invest-
ment indexes, we have simply to expand the set of equations to accommodate
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them. In theory, the investment index r may change for each trader. Fig. 7
shows two cumulative distributions of our ideal economic society of 100,000
agents. The social index is f = 0.3, the poverty index is h = 0.05 and the
investment index is r1 = 0.075 or r1 = 0.055 for 50,000 agents and r2 = 0
for the other 50,000 agents. The curves look very similar to the empirical
distributions found in Refs. [4] and [5], and in Fig. 1. The Pareto exponents
are α = 1.5 ± 0.02 and α = 2.5 ± 0.02, which are in the range the empirical
distributions.
However, Fig. 7 shows that the Pareto law characterize only 1% of the pop-
ulation, while in the simulation we assumed that 50% of the population is
characterized by a trade-investment economy and the other 50% by a trade-
alone economy. This fact suggests that the multiplicative process of the trade-
investment economy is effective only for a small portion of the population. In
fact, Fig. 8 suggests a slightly different and deeper interpretation of the dy-
namics of the trade-investment model. Fig. 8 shows the cumulative probability
of two trade-investment economies with two different poverty index h = 0.03
and h = 0.09. The investment index r = 0.075 and the social index f = 0.3
are the same for all members of the society, so the computer simulation is
done by using only one kind of evolution equation Eq. (9).
In fact, the explanation of Fig. 8 is quiet suggestive. The society may be
divided in two groups: the small rich class, almost 1% of the population,
and all the others. The difference between the two groups is in the economic
mechanism that has the greatest effect on the wealth of each group. The
meaning of the results shown in Figs. 7 and 8 is that the change of wealth of
the rich class is more influenced by the investment economy while the wealth
of all the others is more influenced by the trade economy. In fact, for people
that are not rich the amount of wealth that they may gain or lose with some
investment is compatible or lower than what they may gain or lose in trades.
Instead, for the rich, trade alone may move only a small portion of their
wealth because most of their trades involve agents poorer than themselves.
So, for the rich, the investment part of the economy dominates, and because
the investment economy is described by a multiplicative process, the wealth of
the rich follows the Pareto inverse power law. For the other side, by increasing
the poverty index, the capacity of the trade to move wealth is amplified and
this explains how by increasing the poverty index h, the difference between
the rich (that are characterized by the investment economy that generates a
Pareto’s wealth distribution), and all the others (that are characterized by
the trade economy that generates a Gamma-like wealth distribution) becomes
more prominent, as shown in Fig. 8.
In summary, the distribution of wealth shows an anomalous shape well de-
scribed by a Gamma distribution at low and middle wealth and a Pareto’s tail
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at high wealth. This complex shape may be approximately described by
p(w) = a wγ
[
exp(−b w) + 1
(1 + c w)γ+δ
]
. (21)
that is a pdf of the type suggested by Montroll and Shlesinger, Eq. (2), and
depends on many parameters that characterize the difference between the
trade and the investment economy. The Pareto index increases by increasing
the social index f or by decreasing the investment index r. The dependency
of the wealth condensation phenomenon on the poverty index h seems more
complex. In fact, in Sec. III we determined that wealth condensation in a
trade-alone economy increases by increasing the poverty index h. However, Fig.
8 shows that in a trade-investment economy, wealth condensation may also
decrease by increasing the poverty index h. Therefore, wealth condensation is
a non-monotonic function of h. We stress that it is necessary to have a valid
trade-interaction model to obtain all the above results. We have shown that
by changing the value of the three indexes, our trade-interaction model is able
to give a consistent explanation of the observed distribution of wealth.
5 Conclusion
While some linear asset exchange models like those based on the mean-field
and kinetic theory approximations may present serious economical paradoxes,
the science of complexity and physically-based models may still yield pos-
sible explanations of the distribution of wealth in a society. The nonlinear
trade-investment model determines the main mechanisms necessary to obtain
a stable three-class society with a Pareto distribution for high incomes. The
mechanisms present in the trade-investment model are an asymmetric trade
interaction that statistically favors the less wealthy of the two traders involved
in the trade and a multiplicative stochastic investment process. A symmetric
trade-alone mechanism would yield a strong wealth condensation phenomenon
and therefore an unstable society. Both mechanisms are necessary to overcome
the wealth condensation effect and stabilize the society. The detailed nature of
the relative contribution of the two mechanisms are determined by the three
control parameters: the social index f, the investment index r and the poverty
index h.
Here, we cannot do a detailed economic analysis of the mechanisms that ad-
vantage the poor in society by inhibiting the transfer of the entire wealth to
the rich. In general, the richer party is less risk averse when bargaining over a
given amount than is the poorer party, therefore the poorer party should be a
stronger bargainer than the rich to get the better of the deal. In particular, we
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can consider the tendency of the poor to look for the best price opportunity
for most single items for saving money, the tendency of the prices to increase
in places where the customers are supposed wealthy, the employee rights that
advantage workers by mean of adequate salary policies, the graduated income
and luxury tax policies that require the rich to pay a higher percentage of
taxes than is paid by the wage earner, and many others. In the absence of
such social and psychological pro-poor mechanisms it is easy to envision that
the society would collapse because the entire wealth would condense into the
hands of a very few people. Also we observe that the above mechanisms can be
interpreted as a kind of generalization of the price discrimination in monopoly
theory [30] applied to the social classes of an entire society.
Investment is the dominant economic tool of the very rich. Montroll and
Shlesinger [8] argued that the rich have economic mechanisms available to
them that the ordinary citizen does not, and these mechanisms provide the
amplification that generates the inverse power law distribution. The trade-
investment model incorporates this amplification through the multiplicative
form of the investment term in the dynamic equation. The magnitude of the
amplification factor is determined by the investment index r.
Trade is the dominant economic tool of the majority of society. Salaries and
taxes are considered particular trades. In the upper economic limit of the
middle class some individuals increase their wealth as much through invest-
ment as they do through trade, providing a transition from a Gamma-like
distribution that characterizes a trade-dominated economy to a Pareto’s tail
distribution produced by the investment economy. What distinguishes the
trade-investment model from other models that have been proposed is the
recognition that in order for a society to be stable, rather than the poor being
exploited in trades with the rich they must have an advantage, at least in a
statistical sense. This statistical advantage acts to narrow the gap in wealth
between the richest and poorest members of society. The two parameters that
control this narrowing of the gap is the social index f , that enables a poor
individual to optimize his/her return in a trade with the rich, and the poverty
index h, that determines the fraction of the poorer agent’s wealth that can be
transferred in any given transaction.
When we implement the trade-investment model with the three indices f , h
and r, the wealth pdf assumes the inverse power-law distribution of Pareto
at the high wealth end, and, more realistically, still retains a small but finite
population at the low wealth end. Moreover, the cumulative distribution of
wealth assumes the shapes depicted in Figs. 7 and 8 that are similar to the
shape depicted in Fig. 1, in which the rich class is distinguished by following
Pareto’s inverse power law and the cumulative distribution of wealth for the
remainder of society is apparently well fit by a Gamma distribution. Numerical
simulations shown that the dynamics of the trade-investment model Eq. (9)
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reproduces the shape of the universal structure of the cumulative distribution
of wealth that is assumed to be similar to the cumulative distributions of
income obtained for phenomenological data from around the world.
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a d c η
f=0.2 3e-3 ± 3e-4 0.147 ± 2e-3 1.64 ± 0.05 1.9 ± 0.05
f=0.3 5e-3 ± 1e-3 0.56 ± 0.02 0.8 ± 0.1 3.9 ± 0.2
f=0.5 0.10 ± 0.06 1.9 ± 0.06 0.5 ± 0.1 6.8 ± 0.5
Table 1
Fitting parameters of Eq. (17) for the trade-alone economy (r=0), see Fig. 3. The
poverty index is fixed h = 0.05.
a b γ δ
f1(w) 6e-5 ± 1e-5 2.6e-2 ± 2e-3 2 ± 0.1 2.15 ± 0.05
f3(w) 5e-4 ± 1e-4 0.17 ± 0.02 5.8 ± 0.6 3.5 ± 0.1
Table 2
Fitting parameters of Eq. (18) for the Trade-investment economy, see Fig. 5. The
social and poverty index are fixed; f = 0.3 and h = 0.05.
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Fig. 1. Cumulative wealth (1996) and income (1998-1999) distributions in United
Kingdom.
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Fig. 2. Cumulative wealth distribution for the symmetry chance model. The indexes
are: h = 0.05, f = 0 and r = 0. Case [1] is after 100 million trade-interactions, and
case [2] is after 200 million trade-interactions. The initial wealth distribution is
uniform. The figure shows that this model yields to a huge wealth gap between
the rich and poor that increases with the number of interactions. The wealth is
measured in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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Fig. 3. Wealth probability density for the asymmetric chance model with a fixed
poverty index h = 0.05. The wealth condensation increases by decreasing the social
index f . The investment index is r = 0. The distributions are fitted by a Gamma
distribution Eq. (17). The fitting parameters are in Table I. The wealth is in units
of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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Fig. 4. Wealth probability density for the asymmetric chance model with a fixed
social index f = 0.2. The wealth condensation increases by increasing the poverty
index h. The distributions are compared to an exponential Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution. The wealth is in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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Fig. 5. Trade-investment economy. The social and poverty index are fixed; f = 0.3
and h = 0.05. The probability distributions (tringles) and (stars) are fitted by us-
ing Eq. (18). The fitting parameters are in Table II. The tail of the probability
distribution (circles) is fitted by a power law of the type 1/xµ+1 where µ = 1.5 in
the Pareto’s exponent. The small picture shows the probability distribution (cir-
cles) in the interval [10:100] that is fitted with an exponential Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution. The wealth is measured in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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Fig. 6. Cumulative probability for an trade-investment economy with h = 0.05,
f = 0.3 and r = 0.075. The Pareto’s exponent is µ = 1.5 ± 0.02. The little pic-
ture shows that in the interval [10:100] the P(w) can be apparently fitted by an
exponential Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. The wealth is measured in units of
the poorest agent’s wealth.
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Fig. 7. Cumulative probability for a double trade-investment economy. One half of
the population has the investment index r2 = 0, the other half of the population
has in one case r1 = 0.075 and in the other r1 = 0.055. In both cases the social
index is f = 0.3 and the poverty index is h = 0.05. The Pareto’s exponents are
µ = 1.5 ± 0.02 and µ = 2.5 ± 0.02. The wealth is measured in units of the poorest
agent’s wealth.
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Fig. 8. Cumulative probability for two trade-investment economies with different
poverty index h. In both cases the social index is f = 0.3 and the investment index
is r = 0.075. The Pareto’s exponents are µ = 1.5 ± 0.02 and µ = 1.35 ± 0.02. The
wealth is measured in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
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